Why are the current rate-1 MACs insecure when instantiated with E'?
The secrecy of chaining values can no longer be kept, which is fatal to their security as MACs.
Assumption: Assumption:
To study the security of MACs based on unpredictable block ciphers, assume all their chaining values are available to adversaries.
1) It explains why current rate-1 MACs are insecure when their block ciphers are only related-key unpredictable; 2) It explains why enciphered CBC and SS-NMAC are secure against Side Channel Attacks as long as their block ciphers are.
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In Compact PGV model, we find -Not meaningful (7) 3 Vulnerable to fixed-(M+T) attack (3) can be used to construct secure MACs for prefix-free messages.
Moreover, we find are in fact equivalent to each other.
There exists 6 invertible 2*2 matrices over GF(2) There exists 6 invertible 2*2 matrices over GF(2), such that The equivalence implies related-mode attacks on them.
-Users take the same key for ; -Adversaries can forge against after querying .
A suggestion to break this equivalence:
For , let and take distinct-and-fixed .
